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 KENNETH SURIN
The Society of  Control and the Managed Citizen
In his brief but prescient essay, “Postscript on Control Societies,”1 Gilles Deleuze suggested 
that in control societies, as opposed to the disciplinary societies of the previous socio-historical 
formation brilliantly analysed by Michel Foucault, capitalism has mutated into a ubiquitous 
“international ecumenical organisation” with the capacity to corral into a single comprehensive 
system even the most disparate structures (scientific, religious, artistic, play and leisure, 
etc.) and kinds of being.  In this new epoch, productive labour is dominated by new forms of 
intellectual production and service provision, which are now able to regulate every sector of 
social life.  Consciousness, the affective and emotional components of human life, and the 
underlying biological bases of these components, are no longer left to “private” spheres but 
are instead relentlessly capitalised by this new regime of accumulation.
In this epoch, the boundary between State and Society is effectively abolished: State and 
Society are now a single universe of interlinked networks, in which all capital can in principle 
be expressed as social capital.  Within this novel context, the production of social cooperation, 
primarily by the service and information industries, has become crucial for capitalism. 
Capitalism has to ensure that the forms of social cooperation are under its constant control, 
and this in turn requires that education, training, the work time-cycle, and so on, never really 
end.  The business time-scale is now “24/7” so that the Tokyo stock exchange is running when 
the one in New York closes, in a ceaseless cycle;  training nowadays is “on the job” as opposed 
to being based on the traditional apprenticeship model (itself a holdover from feudalism);  with 
internet banking and financial services one can conduct financial transactions virtually every 
minute of the day; and education becomes “continuing education,” that is, something that 
continues throughout life, and is not confined to those aged 6-22.  This cultural propensity, 
whose heart is the computer-driven system of vastly ramified communications networks, is 
reflected in the current regime of capitalist accumulation, where production has become 
metaproduction, that is, no longer focused – in the advanced economies at any rate – on the 
use of raw materials to produce finished goods, but rather on the sale of services (especially 
in the domain of finance and credit) and the generation of “know how,” a kind of theoretical 
expertise which can be sold to less advanced countries to be turned into finished products. 
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Social control is no longer left to schools and police forces, but is now a branch of marketing, 
as even politics has become “retail politics,” in which politicians seek frantically for an image 
of themselves to hawk to the electorate, and public relations consultants are more important 
to prime ministers and presidents than trustworthy and well-trained civil servants (more will be 
said about this later).  Recording, whether in administration or business, is no longer based on 
the written document kept in the appropriate box of files, but on bar-coding and other forms 
of electronic tagging, as well as a myriad number of data-processing instruments.
The implications of the above-mentioned developments for politics are simply momentous, 
and the ensuing sections will consider them in an American context, the assumption being 
that the American version of this mode of societal regulation is the one most expressive of 
the current capitalist system of accumulation.  The emphasis will be on the creation of the 
form of political subjectivity most congruent with the structures and strategies put in place 
by control societies.
THE NEW MODE OF SOCIETAL REGULATION
In addition to an economic order (whose governing logic is the macroeconomic relation 
between investment, production, and accumulation) there is also a political order governed 
by another quite specific logic of power accumulation or domination, and a domestic order 
governed by a logic of “human resource” reproduction – this domestic order being the source 
of economic accumulation as well as of the political accumulation of power.2  These three 
orders have been decisively transformed in societies of control.  
The reproduction of human resources, anodyne though this phrase may sound, involves at its 
core the reproduction of subjectivities and identities.  Anyone inclined to doubt the necessity 
of this set of societal operations focused on the reproduction of subjectivities and identities 
need only consider how the political ascendancy of the Republican Party in the United 
States is due in large part to a carefully nurtured coalition between pro-business interests 
and networks of conservative Christian evangelicals.3  And where the constitution of the 
subjectivities and identities of conservative American Christian evangelicals is concerned, the 
convergence of a number of key factors had to be achieved before this group could contribute 
to this Republican Party ascendancy. These included cultural norms (especially a particular 
ideology of the nuclear family that would however have been starkly incomprehensible to 
the first Christians); a moral code with a specific conception of “values” (the anti-abortion, 
anti-gay rights, pro-death penalty, etc., stance of many conservative American evangelicals); 
a repertoire of religious doctrines (having primarily to do with what has come to be called 
“the gospel of success” – i.e. “with Jesus on your side you can become a millionaire, win the 
lottery, clinch the deal,” etc.); access to the media (especially television and the Internet); as 
well as the ability to acquire significant streams of revenue. Hence, if Christians in the United 
States had been formed in terms of their subjectivity and identity in the way that European 
Lutherans are, or impoverished Catholics living in a Brazilian favella are, say, then the likelihood 
of their being professed Christians and supporters of anything like a neo-conservative agenda 
are slim, if not nonexistent.  For any group to be formed into political agents of a distinctive 
kind (and here American evangelical Christians are no exception), certain “mentalities” have 
Surin – Society of Control – Junctures, 8, Jun 2007
13
to be cultivated at the expense of others, and certain ideals and conceptions of “truth” and 
“goodness” have to be promoted while others are not.  Only when this was accomplished 
could an alliance between business interests and conservative Christian evangelicals be 
brought about on behalf of the Republican Party, and the seemingly counterintuitive alliance 
between Christianity and a blatantly pro-business ideology be enabled.
After all, it is not immediately obvious why individuals who profess to be Christians should be so 
accommodating of the Halliburtons and Enrons of this world, or be vociferous enthusiasts for 
an invasion of Iraq (here it is perhaps notable that both the late John Paul II and his successor 
Benedict XVI, neither of them renowned for their liberal proclivities, were publicly opposed to 
the American invasion of Iraq, while the American churches have been noticeably silent on 
the morality of this invasion).  Only when a convergence (or “strategic coupling” in the words 
of Bob Jessop) between the economic mode of production and the socio-political mode of 
domination is realized, can a situation be brought about in which it is easy for the Enrons and 
Halliburtons of this world to operate with the consent, explicit or tacit, of the overwhelming 
majority of American citizens.4 
An almost perfect concrete illustration of how this “control society” socio-economic mode of 
domination operates is provided by the typical campaign pitch of the three-term Republican 
senator Phil Gramm of Texas, who also ran for president in 1996.  Gramm would often 
challenge his Texan electorate to choose between “pulling the wagon” (i.e. being someone 
who “worked hard,” etc.) and “riding the wagon” (i.e. being someone who milked the welfare 
system, etc.).5  The ideological tilt of this challenge is not difficult to discern: most Texan voters 
would want to see themselves as hard-working pullers of the wagon, and not the shirkers and 
parasites who sponge off the hard-working souls being psychologically enticed by Gramm into 
identifying with, and thus voting for him (heaven forbid that Senator Gramm should appear 
to be anything but a wagon-puller!).  The truth of the matter however is the total opposite. 
While the “pullers of the wagon” are those who in the main would like to see themselves as 
“hard-working” Texans, those who are the wagon’s “passengers” are much more likely to 
be the hugely wealthy CEOs of Enron, Halliburton, and Worldcom (that is to say, the kind of 
entrepreneur who typically enjoyed Gramm’s unflinching support while he was a politician), 
and so on, as opposed to the run-of-the-mill welfare scrounger whom Gramm invited his 
electorate to despise – i.e. someone who, no matter how ingenious they are in their attempts 
to get a free ride out of the welfare system, will only be able to bilk this system of the tiniest 
fraction of what a CEO like Bernie Ebbers or the late Ken Lay would have acquired as a result 
of the fraudulent practices of a Worldcom or Enron. 
A mode of societal regulation rendering inevitable and acceptable practices such as the 
one which gave Phil Gramm an 18-year stint in the US Senate merits analysis.  An aura of 
eye-winking acceptability is conferred by this mode of societal regulation on the conduct of 
politicians like Gramm and business executives like Enron’s Ken Lay (at least until Enron’s 
senior executives were caught with their fingers in the proverbial till), as indeed it is with 
regard to a whole range of business practices (the recent scandal involving the Republican 
lobbyist Jack Abramoff is especially revealing in this regard, though at the time of writing not 
all the facts of this case have been disclosed). 
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The distinctive phenomenological features of this “control society,” and overwhelmingly 
American mode of societal regulation include the following: 
(i) an inveterate patriotism, involving the unchallengeable conviction that America’s special 
place in the global order is one that it is absolutely entitled to; 
(ii) a disposition to favour “business” solutions over those based on an adequately 
functioning civil society (or at any rate, the interests of civil society in the US are presumed 
by its ruling élite to be absolutely coextensive with those of its corporations); 
(iii) appeals to religion, especially those invoking notions of a special providence guiding 
America and those who pledge their allegiance to it; 
(iv) a decided preference for incarceration and execution as the “best” way to deal with 
social ills; 
(v) the equation of wealth with supposed virtue, so that poverty comes to possess a taint 
of criminality or individual dereliction (given expression in the catchphrase sometimes 
heard on right-wing talk radio shows: “If you’re so smart, and you ain’t rich, what’s 
wrong with you?”); 
(vi) the conviction that the United States gives much, very much, more to the rest of the 
world than other countries and their citizens give to it (“America, the indispensable 
nation,” in the words of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright); 
vii)  the fantasy, common to both Republican and Democratic politicians and the mass 
media, that everyone in America is “middle class” or belongs to a “working family” 
(but never the working class, which cannot be mentioned because that would be to 
subscribe to “class warfare”). Thus the class origins of income inequities are effaced at 
a single stroke, since presumably Bill and Melinda Gates and their children somehow 
constitute a “working family”; and the overwhelmingly African-American janitors at my 
university are “middle class” (like the Gates family?), even though some of them have 
to hold two or even three jobs to pay the rent, afford health care and a retirement plan, 
and provide for their children’s educations, etc.; 
viii)  low levels of political participation, as witnessed by the fact that over half the citizens 
do not vote6; and 
ix)  related ideologically to (vii) is the culturally-sanctioned propensity to accept relatively 
high levels of inequality as the unavoidable consequence of being a “society of 
opportunity and freedom”, “a culture of enterprise and competition”, etc.7
This mode of societal regulation operates in tandem with its concomitant mode of economic 
production. Here of course the unavoidable fact is the US’s abandonment of the postwar 
“compromise” between labor and capital, reflected in such programs as Lyndon Johnson’s 
“Great Society,” but swiftly abandoned when the implicit or explicit Keynesianism underpinning 
that “compromise” unraveled in the early 1970s, as the US then made a rapid transition from 
Keynesianism to neoliberalism in accordance with the American ruling élite’s preferred way of 
dealing with the “stagflation” that ensued from the termination of this historic “compromise.” 
This abandonment of the so-called Keynesian “compromise” became the core of the ensuing 
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“neoliberalism,” with its emphasis on the market as the unquestioned universal mechanism 
for dealing with every kind of problem (“market fundamentalism”), thereby encompassing 
the cultural and the social, as much as the financial and entrepreneurial, domains.  The 
theoretical underpinnings of this new regime of accumulation gained widespread credence, 
and became a conventional wisdom all over the world; the Chile of General Pinochet, the 
Britain of Mrs Thatcher, the Italy of Silvio Berlusconi, the Japan of Junichiro Koizumi, the New 
Zealand of then Prime Minister Jim Bolger, and international organisations such as the IMF 
and World Bank, all endorsed this conventional wisdom.  
The core of this succeeding regime of accumulation, when adequately described and 
analysed, soon expresses the not-so-secret result of this transition to a neoliberal strategy 
of accumulation.  In essence, the power of labor in relation to capital had, for this neoliberal 
regime of accumulation, to be reduced drastically; and the power of capital, especially the 
burgeoning forms of financial capital, had to be expanded at the expense of those whose 
incomes were wage-based.
The most immediate outcome of this shift to a form of accumulation privileging forms of 
income not based on the wage relation was a growing inequality.  In particular, with an 
increased percentage of managerial remuneration being dispensed in the form of stock 
options – creating what Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy call “the ownership-management 
interface” – managers of corporations were given a huge incentive to maximize “stockholder 
value” at the expense of all other business considerations, such as long-term investment in 
their enterprises, and so on.8  However, those workers constrained by the wage relation could 
not enhance their income in this way.  How many stock options can a factory worker making 
$70,000 a year (which is a respectable wage for “blue collar” jobs, since it is almost one-and-
a-half times the current median US income) hold in comparison to an executive who makes 
$700,000 a year (which is not after all a huge salary for most Fortune 500 American business 
executives)?  The differences between CEO income and the incomes of those relying on waged 
work is staggering: CEOs have been able to reward themselves with big payments, typically 
in the form of stock options and other kinds of “partnership income,” while in real terms US 
wages have declined.  The result is a new rapprochement between ownership and the upper 
tier of the salaried class, with “partnership income” becoming increasingly significant in the 
composition of the remuneration of this upper echelon of the salaried class who, because 
the “discipline” of the wage relation has been swept to one side for its members, now have 
income levels that accelerate much more quickly than those who are paid through wages. 
The available data on income differences bears out this observation, with those making over 
$200,000 a year deriving a greatly increased proportion of their income from capital gains, 
and the US now reaching levels of income inequality last seen during the “Gilded Age” of the 
1920s and 30s (see Figure 1):
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Figure 1: The top 0.01% income share in US total household income (excluding capital gains) and three 
components, 1918-2000 (Source: Duménil and Lévy, “Neoliberal Income Trends: Wealth, Class and 
Ownership in the USA,” New Left Review, 30 (new series, 2004), figure 2, 109.)
The new American plutocracy is now visible even in smaller towns in the US, especially those 
just outside the bigger cities in the Sunbelt (Marietta outside Atlanta, Cary near Raleigh, 
Reston outside Washington DC, and so on), which find themselves dealing with the challenges 
of “McMansion” construction, when older properties are torn down to make way for fake 
mansions with huge foyers, living and dining rooms festooned with chandeliers, garages for 
four or five sports utility vehicles, a bathroom for every bedroom, a required swimming pool 
and jacuzzi, and manicured lawns with chemically-treated grass exuding a preternaturally 
green color (“a greener green than real grass”).  These residences are often maintained 
by teams of low-paid workers, usually immigrants from Central and South America, who do 
everything from house cleaning to swimming pool maintenance, to providing child care and 
the inevitable lawn service.9  What has enabled this new Gilded Age to come into being, where 
a few benefit from riches that the overwhelming majority can only dream about?
The brief answer has to be that the new Gilded Age results from a combination of convictions 
now enshrined in American culture, in conjunction with the economic requirements of the 
neoliberal regime of accumulation.  This “strategic coupling” of culture and economics has 
resulted in a new kind of politics, a “post-political politics,” in which citizens are not really 
represented, but managed in the interest of a ruthlessly pro-business political agenda.  I 
take this “post-political politics” to be the core of the insight made available by Deleuze 
in his account of the society of control.  Most of the narrative and analysis provided below 
focuses on the United States, but the “managed citizen” of the US has his or her counterparts 
in nearly every one of the advanced industrial countries, and so it behooves us to provide a 
characterization of this quintessential citizen of the society of control.
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THE MANAGED CITIZEN
Thanks mainly to the means made available by the most recent mass media technologies 
and the Internet, American, Antipodean, and most western European politics today are 
representational only in name.  If we believe that the core principles of the American system 
of political representation are provided by the Constitution, then a brief but telling snapshot of 
what Americans believe regarding their constitutional freedoms is provided by the nonpartisan 
annual State of the First Amendment survey, conducted since 1997 by the University of 
Connecticut.10  The 2005 survey revealed that 23% of Americans said “the First Amendment 
goes too far in the rights it guarantees,” compared to 49% in 2002 (the first survey done 
after 9-11) and down from 30% in 2004.  The 2003 survey showed that 46% of those polled 
believed that the press had too much freedom, and almost one-third of those surveyed in 2003 
believed that anti-war protests should be forbidden when America was fighting a war.  About 
50% of those surveyed in 2003 said the American press had been too aggressive in asking 
government representatives for information about the war on terrorism.  The 2002 survey 
showed that more than 40% wanted to curb the academic freedom of professors and prohibit 
criticism of US military policy.  Around 50% of those polled in 2002 said the government should 
be permitted to monitor religious groups in the interest of national security, even at the cost 
of violating the Constitution’s provisions regarding religious freedom.  More than 40% in the 
2002 survey said the government should be given greater power to monitor Muslims living 
in the United States more than other religious groups.  So much for the “American love of 
freedom” touted by George W Bush and his handlers!  But what such survey numbers visibly 
indicate is the very high level of insecurity (with or without an associated threshold of low 
information) evinced by the respondents involved. The question of the causes that underlie 
this condition of the American citizenry has to be posed.  
Of course, data of the kind provided above are merely symptomatic, and a more complete 
account of the system that allows such responses as the ones conveyed in these surveys to 
be “normalised” has to be forthcoming before a clearer sense of the political subjectivities 
displayed in these survey responses can be gleaned.  How can a country that has an apparently 
inviolable belief in its status as a free and democratic country, a “shining city on the hill” 
which also happens to be the wealthiest nation in the world, nonetheless have so much social 
and economic inequality, a patently racialised system of incarceration and the imposition of 
the death penalty, with over 20% of its population lacking health insurance (while it spends 
vast sums of money on its military), as well as having a much poorer record of environmental 
protection than all other industrialized countries, while also being burdened by a system of 
institutionalized and legalized political corruption that would scarcely be credible if an attempt 
were made to introduce it to another advanced industrial nation?11  What is the nature of 
the typical modes of political subjectivity that allow such a “post-political” polity to function 
in the way that it does?  Here, at least a sketch of the model responsible for the production 
of these political subjectivities is needed.
In its ideal and most general form the notion of a representational democracy requires “an 
informed and involved” citizenry to choose in “free and fair” elections representatives who 
will then convene with other similarly elected representatives to determine what the laws of 
that country should be.  Hence, it is a truism that the degree to which citizens are not able to 
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participate in this system in the prescribed way will indicate that this system is not truly capable 
of undertaking the functions required by this “ideal type” of representational democracy. 
How near is the Western model of government to this “ideal type” of representational 
democracy?
There is nowadays a widespread acknowledgement, irrespective of political affiliation, that 
the resources for political mobilisation afforded by the latest mass media technologies and 
the Internet have drastically transformed the nature and forms of political involvement – at 
least in comparison with the alternatives associated with previously regnant media forms 
and the strategic opportunities they provided for a putative electorate.  The “informed and 
involved” citizen of the previous paradigm of representational democracy has effectively given 
way to a new kind of citizen, sometimes referred to as “the managed citizen,” “the citizen of 
governmentality,” and so on.12
Citizenship in the US today is basically “thin, shadowy, and privatized,” to use the description 
provided by Philip N Howard in his absorbing study of the ways in which objects for political 
consumption are produced through the application of today’s hypermedia technologies. 
Howard’s study draws attention to a fact that has been overlooked in many discussions 
of citizenship – that historically the US has had many kinds of citizens, each with different 
“informational needs,” and that hypermedia technologies have if anything added to this 
differentiation.13  These new technologies “remove the burden of being informed while 
expressing public opinion” by privileging voices expressive of outrage at the expense of those 
that are informed (185).  Such voices are invariably required to provide preset responses to 
political options that have been simplified in advance (for example, more than three years 
after the US invasion of Iraq, the US media still provides very little scope for those who want to 
say that Saddam Hussein’s regime was without qualification morally unacceptable while also 
holding to the view that the American invasion of Iraq was a flagrant breach of international 
law, and that Tony Blair and George W Bush should therefore be charged in an international 
tribunal for war crimes).
The quintessential manifestation of “thin citizenship” is the computer-generated signature 
campaign, which requires only a few strokes of the keyboard to make someone feel they 
are involved in a political movement.  Government in such a setting then becomes primarily 
a matter of being seen to redress grievances, and thus of providing a few “sound bite” 
positions that can easily be assimilated by “low information” subjects who have relatively 
crude benchmarks for feeling that the grievances in question are being addressed by officials. 
A prime-time television appearance by George W Bush in a Potemkin village setting in New 
Orleans (with special floodlighting of the cathedral background while most of New Orleans 
was still without electricity, etc.) and a couple of other presidential “appearances” quickly 
reduced the numbers of those who said in opinion polls that the government was not doing 
enough to expedite relief after Hurricane Katrina, and helped foster the completely erroneous 
impression that the (legitimate) grievances of those needing help in New Orleans were being 
addressed by the Bush administration, when in fact they were not.The floodlights did not shine 
on the mountains of debris a short distance from where Bush made his reassuring noises in 
front of the television cameras. The aim of such media orchestrations is less to “convince” 
those with firmly settled convictions, who are apt to regard themselves as “activists,” and 
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much more to draw on those less committed factions whose opinion-poll responses can tilt 
the balance this or that way (“the marginal voter”).  The target in these new-media political 
campaigns tends therefore to be those who are less informed and somewhat wavering in 
their attitudes – those who, as with their choice of beverage, may in all likelihood want any 
political option served up to them to be “lite” (and nothing but “lite”).  “Political choice” in this 
kind of media-fuelled “representational democracy” has metamorphosed into the ability to 
register one’s opinions and little else (the individuals with the real choices in such a system 
are the ones with money-bags heavy enough to induce politicians to do their bidding).  The 
difference between a “politics lite” or “thin democracy” (to use Perry Anderson’s phrase), 
favoring “hot button” single issues and little else, and its real alternative, is stated thus by 
Philip Howard:
[The hypermedia campaigns] allow citizens to manage their distance from 
political issues.  Candidates must remain ideologically competitive, and they 
use hypermedia to present different and sometimes conflicting ideological 
packages to different communities or supporters.  The thin polity may have an 
immense total supply of information that is only sparingly shared among citizens.  
Information is unevenly distributed among communities, except for citizens with 
good search skills or those who can hire consultants with good information 
management skills.  Conversely, a thick public sphere would have consistent, 
rich sources of political information in which all citizens can be immersed.14
It would be foolish however to think that the way to restore a “thicker” practice of citizenship 
is by going back to a Golden Age (which in any event never did exist), in which more people 
read serious newspapers, took the trouble to be informed about politics, and were more 
concerned about a candidate’s position on the issues of the day than they were about his or 
her smile, hair color, jawline, lack of height, the rock stars or sports personalities supporting 
the candidate, etc., etc.  Howard makes the point that what did happen in previous times 
was not anything that accorded with this mythical Golden Age.  Rather, what existed then in 
the US was a system that enabled patronage networks to be lined up behind party positions 
that were more or less loosely demarcated by ideology, so that to vote “left” generally meant 
being mildly in favor of worker’s rights, welfare transfers, increased spending on education, 
taxes on corporate profits, etc., and to vote “right” meant voting for lower taxes, reduction 
of the social safety net, the implementation of pro-business policies, etc.  The merits of 
these patronage networks should not be exaggerated, since they were primarily machines 
for getting voters to the polls, and had little or sometimes nothing to do with bringing about 
radical social change.  But they did serve the minimal purpose of giving voters effective clues 
about party alignments on social and economic issues.  These patronage networks have 
now dissolved, as both American parties have become unrelentingly pro-business, hostile to 
wealth redistribution of even the most restrained kind, in favor of wholesale marketization, 
reflexively pro-military, and so forth, and can only separate themselves from each other by 
the populist stances they take on such “value issues” as gun control, gay marriage, the 
“right to die,” abortion, the death penalty, hanging the Ten Commandments in courthouses, 
prayer in schools, teenage chastity pledges, teaching evolution in schools, schooling for the 
children of undocumented immigrants, and so on.  Both parties are now appendages of the 
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military-industrial-entertainment-Wall Street complex, and make no pretense whatsoever of 
being otherwise.  The outcome in the US is a diminished public sphere, with “thin citizenship,” 
culminating in what Tom Mertes has rightly called a “Republican proletariat.”15
This public sphere is further eviscerated by another practice that defines “thin citizenship” 
– in this case the use made by political organizations of our “data shadow” to shape and 
predict the preferences of voters.  This “shadow” is the “data trail” left behind by citizens as 
they negotiate life in an electronic society – credit card purchases, magazine subscriptions, 
polling information, organization memberships, voter registration data, etc. – that can be used 
by political organizations to “deduce” the different kinds of “political personality” that can 
then be appealed to through the hypermedia in specifically tailored ways (such as election 
advertisements with an anti-gun control pitch in districts with a high proportion of licensed 
hunters, etc.).  To quote Howard again:
What is meaningfully represented in contemporary political institutions is not 
you but your data shadow, the political personality deduced from data about you.  
Sometimes your opinion diverges from what statistically derived models say your 
opinion is, and some of us know how to manage our data shadows while others 
do not.  Some of us know what our data shadow looks like, while others do not.  
However, the data that constitutes [sic] our political personalities, including 
explicit citizenship acts and the implicit political meanings of consumer behavior, 
are bought and sold in the market.  In this sense, hypermedia campaigns have 
“privatized citizenship.”16
The informational needs of citizens have thus become commoditized by private businesses 
which sell the resultant commodities to political organizations for their campaigns.  This 
information is then packaged into a media format that can be “narrowcast” to personalised 
voter niches (using such labels as “security mom,” “town and gown,” “pool and patio,” “Nascar 
dad,” “New Age and granola,” etc., to specify these niches), and the result is an informational 
political culture that more and more resembles the kind of “infotainment” peddled on cable 
television.  As a consequence, says Howard,
the incentive to participate is not the public service but relief from private wrongs, 
as framed by hypermedia campaigns.  Political hypermedia are designed to 
move democratic conduct from the public sphere of rallies, town hall meetings, 
newspaper editorials, and coffee shop debates to the private sphere of screens, 
key strokes, and highly personalized news services.  For campaign managers 
and policy makers, commercial data about voter preferences make it easier 
to evaluate and push both public and individual sentiments ….  [P]olitical 
hypermedia are deliberately designed to privatize in multiple senses of the word: 
to move the logistics of citizenship from the public to the private sector, into the 
private world of home and work space, where individuals act more out of private 
discontent on select issues than out of public duty for collective welfare.17
As a result, citizens are increasingly likely to be mobilized by a “backlash” populism that trades 
on the resentments of voters, whether real or (as is more likely to be the case) trumped up 
by a demagogic hypermedia campaign.  Hypermedia campaigns can also be used to destroy 
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the credibility of political opponents, as shown by the Willie Horton episode that helped get 
Bush Senior elected, or the “Swift Boat” Veterans media campaign in the 2004 presidential 
election which deflected attention from Bush Junior’s patchy record in the National Guard 
during the Vietnam War.
“Thin citizenship” is amplified by the growing contribution cybertechnology makes to the 
society of the spectacle, which now so thoroughly permeates American politics that political 
campaigns are effectively reduced to a set formula, namely, “spin plus spectacle.”  Thus George 
W Bush was seen landing on an aircraft carrier in his flight suit; an uncomfortable-looking 
Michael Dukakis was televised riding in the turret of a massive tank in the 1988 presidential 
campaign; the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein (with the Stars and Stripes attached 
to its head), when the first phase of the American invasion was completed, turned out to be 
a well-staged media event and not a spontaneous act on the part of Iraqi citizens.  Tony Blair 
had his “I’m the uniter of the nation” moment in front of the television cameras when Princess 
Diana died, and politicians flock to disaster sites like vultures, knowing the cameras will be 
there to show them in their “leadership roles.”  Even the refusal of the US Department of 
Defense to allow cameras to film the arrival of the caskets of US military personnel killed in 
Iraq testifies to the power of the society of the spectacle: in this case, of course, the fear of 
the government is that the true nature of the price being paid by poorer Americans who join 
the military to have what they think will be a better life will be shown all too clearly.18 
In the era of managed citizenship, as described above, political advantage is perceived or 
projected to lie in “the center” (Clintonite “triangulation,” Blair’s “Third Way,” and so on), and 
this perception has two consequences: parties gravitate towards the right while giving the 
illusion that it is their opponents who have in fact abandoned the center, and political élites 
become increasingly disconnected from their voters.  Thus the US has two right-wing parties, a 
no-holds-barred right-wing party, and an indistinctly right-wing party (“I support the center, but 
I’m leaning, leaning to the center right” would be the appropriate refrain for most Democratic 
politicians in the US today); and the same is true in Britain of both Blair’s “New” Labour and 
the Conservative Party.19  If there is a serious third party in an election in the US or UK (these 
countries being the prime exemplars of the Anglo-Saxon model of neoliberal capitalism, and 
thus of the control society), it has invariably to struggle to fit itself into this schema which allows 
the two main parties to move to the right while conveying the impression that the “third” or 
“alternative” party is by its very nature too “extremist” to belong to the fictitious center defined 
by the two established parties. The Rainbow Coalition’s efforts in the 1988 US presidential 
election and Ralph Nader’s campaign in the 2000 presidential election were both portrayed 
by “mainstream” Democrats and Republicans alike as too “extremist” to deserve votes. 
Similarly, any attempt in British politics by the third-party Liberal Democrats to make a move 
away from this fictitious “center” in a more progressive direction is immediately stigmatised 
by both Labour and Conservative politicians as an unacceptable “lurch to the left.”
Another consequence of this shift to a system of managed citizenship has been to move 
the emphasis away from parties and ideological platforms and place it instead on the 
“personalities” (already shaped by the “behavior technologies” of the hypermedia system) of 
candidates – who must then have the money to run a protracted media campaign if they are 
to get anywhere.  But candidates per se are never as durable as traditional parties and the 
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ideologies they embody and, with the deemphasizing of the latter, electorates have weak and 
tenuous links to the parties they notionally vote for: if a “more attractive” candidate shows 
up for the opposing party in the next election, then one simply changes one’s allegiance 
and “splits the ticket” at the next election.  Hence, a significant number of working-class 
Democrats voted for George W Bush in 2004, enticed by his “moral stance” on gay marriage, 
just as they voted in overwhelming numbers for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 on the 
basis of his airy proclamations to the effect that it was “morning again in America” (Reagan’s 
pronouncements were even then characterised by pundits and “opinion shapers” as part of 
the “feel good” factor in politics that can win elections for those who in truth are singularly 
uninformed and not very intelligent candidates, but who can prevail electorally if they make 
enough voters “feel good”).
In an era where citizenship is now managed, the question of political transformation poses itself 
even more urgently.  A managed citizenry, beholden to the seemingly endless succession of 
spectacles that are now the focal point of contemporary political campaigning in such control 
societies, will in all probability not be in a position to initiate a radical political shift in favour 
of those who are impoverished and socially marginalized. The government in such a control 
society has sufficient resources to neutralize opposition to its ruling élites by changing its 
strategies of citizen management and by putting on new spectacles.  The high proportion of 
respondents in polls taken around the start of the American occupation of Iraq who believed 
that Saddam Hussein was responsible for the World Trade Center bombings is a telling 
reminder of the American state’s power to dragoon its people into compliance through media 
manipulation and fear-instilling propaganda. 
This indicates that the impetus for comprehensive and radical social change will have to come 
from those parts of the world where there is no such system of managed citizenship, nor the 
resources for launching a society of the spectacle. This points to the countries of the South, 
who have a considerably greater incentive to overthrow an economic system that confers 
systemic advantages on the wealthy industrialized countries to the disadvantage of the South, 
even if at the same time not all these advantages are reflected in the incomes of the poorest 
citizens of the countries of the North (and the US in particular).  But the managed citizenry 
which increasingly populates the wealthy countries of the North and West is of course not really 
interested in bringing about significant changes that will help the countries of the South and 
East, especially if these changes involve substantial wealth transfers from the North to the 
South.  Moreover, the attempts by the richer nations to promote a “low-intensity democracy” 
in the poorer countries (which will not really change much in a poor country, but which will 
do enough to ensure the modicum of stability required to let multinational corporations get 
on with their business) have their exact complement in their governments’ own efforts to 
manage their citizens in order to ensure compliancy.20 
In both zones, North/West and South/East, what is fundamentally being sought is the 
wholesale quiescence of citizens.  Is this the pass that things have come to in the age of 
control societies: a citizenry managed through the cybernetic technologies in the North/West, 
while the countries of the South/East make do with a promised patina of democratic and 
human rights while having to toe the line set down by the IMF and World Bank, or else face 
ostracism from the international economic order?  21
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